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or U.S. monetary policy, 1994 was 
an eventful year.  Despite little change
in measured price inﬂation, expecta-
tions of inﬂation began increasing in 
late 1993, as interest rates on 10-year 
government bonds climbed more than 
150 basis points between October 1993
and April 1994.  Against this backdrop,
the Federal Reserve raised the target 
federal funds rate in February 1994, 
the ﬁrst of seven increases in a span 
of 12 months.  Before this, the Fed 
had held the target funds rate steady 
at 3 percent since September 1992.  
Most market watchers interpreted 
the increases in the target funds rate
between February 1994 and February
1995 as monetary tightening.  Because
there is no clear link between an inﬂation
target and adjustments of the Federal
Reserve’s funds rate target, however, 
interpreting funds rate changes is 
often difﬁcult.
The purpose of this article is to
explain changes in the federal funds 
rate as the outcome of an implicit policy 
of inﬂation targeting.  We advance the
view that the increases in the federal funds
rate in 1994 were designed to target a 
low and relatively stable inﬂation rate.
The empirical strategy is to extract from
funds rate changes an estimated inﬂation
target, which serves as an indicator of 
the stance of monetary policy.  With this
indicator, it is possible to analyze whether
the recent string of seven increases in 
the federal funds rate was consistent 
with a constant inﬂation target.  In other
words, our indicator model suggests 
that the fundamental stance of monetary
policy can remain unchanged, even 
when the funds rate is changing, provided 
that the funds rate changes are consistent 
with a constant target inﬂation rate. By
contrast, the conventional view holds 
that interest-rate hikes necessarily 
connote a change in the stance of
monetary policy. 
In the next section we describe the
interest-rate feedback mechanism (or
policy rule) used to describe U.S. monetary
policy and the meaning of its parameters.
We also contrast our 1994 indicator model
with Taylor’s (1993) rule, although both
specify current adjustments to interest-rate
instruments believed to be consistent 
with achieving a long-run inﬂation target.
Our empirical model, like Evans and
Wachtel (1993), identiﬁes changes
between inﬂation regimes.  The variable
that switches in our model, however, is
“intended” or target inﬂation, as opposed
to realized inﬂation.  
The subsequent section presents esti-
mates of implicit inﬂation targets in the
past 25 years and dates when the inﬂation
target appeared to shift.  
In the ﬁnal section we offer 
some answers to these three questions:
• How close to price stability has 
the implicit inﬂation target been 
in the past? 
• How close to price stability is 
the implicit inﬂation target now? 
• How well does a model of inﬂation
targeting describe actual monetary
policy decisions? 
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Because the United States has no
formal inﬂation targets, the implicit inﬂa-
tion target needs to be  estimated.  Our
indicator model assumes an inﬂation-
targeting regime, where policymakers look
one year ahead and aim to close the gap
between the current inﬂation rate and a
target rate. Such a one-year-ahead
framework closely resembles the practice
in countries that have announced explicit
annual or multi-year inﬂation targets, such
as the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden,
Finland, and New Zealand.  Leiderman and
Svensson (1995) provide an overview of
policies in countries with formal or semi-
formal inﬂation targets.  The Reserve Bank
of New Zealand, for example, announced a
“step function” of decreasing annual inﬂa-
tion targets as a path toward a long-run
target of 0 to 2 percent annual inﬂation.    
Dueker and Fischer (1994) argue that
inﬂation indicator models provide useful
information regarding implicit inﬂation
objectives embedded in past and present
policy actions.  The goal of the indicator
model is to provide a guide for monetary
policy discussion by illustrating whether
currently contemplated policy actions are
consistent with the current implicit target
or baseline rate of inﬂation.  We estimate
the implicit inﬂation target as a time-varying
parameter in an interest-rate feedback
mechanism.  Feedback comes from the
price level, which could be targeted in
levels; the growth rate (the inﬂation rate);
or an intermediate policy, a combination of
the two, with a levels target that gradually
accommodates drift in the target path.  
 
Targeting Inﬂation Using a
Monetary Instrument
When targeting inﬂation using an
interest-rate instrument, the key question
is, By how much should the funds rate
change so that it is expected, but not cer-
tain, that inﬂation will adjust as desired in
the coming year?  This question is analogous
to asking, By how much does the money
supply have to grow to hit a nominal gross
domestic product (GDP) growth target?
With the latter, it is well-known from the
equation of exchange that the predicted
income velocity of money is an important
link between desired nominal income growth
and money growth.  Nevertheless, it is
instructive to review why velocity forecasts
are so useful for targeting nominal GDP
with a monetary instrument.  
In this example, if 
 
y is the log of 
nominal GDP , 
is desired nominal GDP growth, v = (y-m)
is the log of velocity, ∆ (y-m)t\t-1 is a forecast
of velocity growth at time t conditional on
information available through time t-1 and
∆ m is money growth, then the targeting
procedure described above prescribes the
following rate of money growth:
(1)
Note that the accuracy of the forecasted
value of (y-m) ought to be somewhat robust
to alternative money growth rates, because
we have reason to believe that higher money
growth will be offset by higher nominal GDP
growth, leaving (y-m) little changed. If
money growth were set according to a fore-
cast of (y+m), on the other hand, such that 
there would be little reason to believe that
the forecasted value of (y+m) would be
accurate for a range of values for ∆ m.  If
the growth rate for m were to increase, no
economic model would suggest that
growth in nominal GDP would decrease to
maintain a nearly constant value of (y+m).
Therefore, because we believe a positive
relationship exists between money growth
and nominal GDP growth, (y-m) is
forecasted and the appropriate targeting
procedure is given in equation 1.
Targeting Inﬂation Using 
An Interest-Rate Instrument
A similar issue arises in targeting 
inﬂation with an interest-rate instrument.
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If R is the nominal interest-rate policy
instrument (the federal funds rate) and 
π is the inﬂation rate as measured by the
consumer price index, then one possibility
is to forecast changes in the real rate of
interest, ∆ (R-π).  Wicksellian theory, how-
ever, suggests that decreases in interest rates
do not cause offsetting decreases in the
inﬂation rate in the short run.  Wicksell
(1936) argues that monetary policy can
effect short-run changes in the real interest
rate charged on bank loans relative to the
marginal real return on physical capital.1
Furthermore, tight monetary policies that
raise market interest rates (relative to the
marginal efﬁciency of investment in new
capital), lead to a shortfall in investment
(relative to savings) and to disinﬂation.
Conversely, an easy monetary policy
that pushes market interest rates temporarily
below the marginal efﬁciency of investment
creates an inﬂationary surge in investment
and aggregate demand.  Hence, our model
uses a forecast of ∆ (R+π) under the assump-
tion that increases in interest rates initiate
disinﬂations, so that increases in R can be
offset by decreases in π.  In this case, the
accuracy of the forecast is somewhat
robust to alternative values of ∆ R.  But
monetary policy can only create a tempo-
rary wedge between the real interest rate
charged on bank loans and the real return
to physical capital.  Disinﬂation eventually
brings about decreases in nominal interest
rates, as suggested by the long-run Fisher
equation R = r + π, where r is the long-run
equilibrium real rate of return.  Carlstrom
(1995) refers to this dynamic as the paradox
of interest rates:  Interest rates must rise in
the short run in order to fall in the long
run.  The Wicksellian view concurs that
nominal interest rates must increase to raise
the real rate of interest on loans for a given
level of expected inﬂation to generate dis-
inﬂation, which eventually leads to a
lowering of inﬂation expectations and
nominal interest rates.
The speciﬁc model of inﬂation targeting
through manipulation of the funds rate
follows.  If π0t is the inﬂation target, then
πt-1 - π0t is the latest information regarding
the gap between recent and target inﬂation.
In this case, the desired change in the inﬂa-
tion rate from the present to the end of 
the coming year is 
As discussed above, our model uses forecasts
of ∆ (R+π) in modeling funds rate changes
with the following inﬂation-targeting
mechanism: 
(2)
In using equation 2 as a model of
funds rate changes, it is necessary to esti-
mate π0.  We must also supply time-series
forecasts for ∆ [R + π]t\t-1 as an input to
equation 2.  Our approach is to estimate a
time-varying coefﬁcient model, as in
Dueker (1993), using the Kalman ﬁlter to
generate the forecasts under the
assumption that the regression coefﬁcients
follow a random walk:
(3)
where inﬂation is the percentage change in
the consumer price index, the TBond is the
10-year government bond rate, and TB3 is
the 3-month Treasury bill rate. [Ft\t-1 is
deﬁned to be the forecast error variance 
of the term ∆ (R + π)t – ∆ (R + π)t\t-1.]  The
empirical model also includes an error
term, e, for deviations between actual funds
rate changes and the changes implied by
the inﬂation-targeting procedure, where et
is independently distributed with mean
zero and a parameter 
 
s2
t , which is propor-
tional to the variance
(4)
The indicator model of equation 4
draws on the concept of nominal feedback
rules, introduced by McCallum (1987,
1988).  It uses a feedback mechanism to
adjust the policy instrument (the funds
rate) in response to recent developments
in inﬂation.  Our model differs from the
work of McCallum (1987, 1988) and Judd
and Motley (1993) by using an interest-
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2 Taylor’s rule also speciﬁes a
long-run level for the nominal
interest-rate instrument, where-
as our model does not.  Our
empirical model is intended to
be a behavioral equation only
for the monetary authority and
not the general equilibrium
economy.  The monetary
authority need not attempt to
impose prior beliefs about the
long-run steady-state level of
nominal interest rates in order
to target inﬂation period by
period.
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rate feedback mechanism as a model of
past and current policy, rather than as a
tool to simulate hypothetical policies.  In
our model, the target rate of inﬂation is
not a normative concept, but a time-varying
parameter to be estimated.  The model ful-
fills a positive function by ascribing implicit
objectives to recent and past policies.  
Taylor’s rule (1993) also describes past
interest-rate policy in terms of a long-run
inﬂation objective, but his rule does not aim
at a particular inﬂation target for the coming
year.  In the Taylor rule, the interest-rate
instrument remains above or below its
long-run level for as long as a gap persists
between recent and long-run target inﬂation,
but there is no timetable for achieving the
target rate.2 Our framework, in contrast,
centers on a one-year timetable for
achieving a desired inﬂation rate.
Time-Varying Estimates of 
The Inﬂation Target
Because the implicit inﬂation target 
of the Federal Reserve has likely changed
during the past 25 years, we allow π0t to
vary through time between a high and a
low state according to an unobservable
Markov process.  Evans and Wachtel (1993)
also model time-varying inﬂation regimes
with Markov processes.  A two-state 
characterization is not as restrictive as it
might ﬁrst appear, because the states are
unobserved so that probabilistic inferences
of the inﬂation target lie anywhere in the
band between the low and high state.  The
estimation problem includes uncovering
estimates of the probabilities of being in
high- and low-inﬂation target states across
time.  The inferred value of the implicit
inﬂation target will be the probability-
weighted sum of the high- and low-inﬂation
targets.  Because the states are allowed to
be serially correlated, this probability-
weighted sum will show persistence.  In
this way, the model-implied target or base-
line rate of inﬂation can adjust relatively
smoothly between the high and low
extremes so as to converge gradually on
the target rate of a long-run disinﬂation
like that undertaken in New Zealand.  
Depending on the value of an
unobserved state variable, S1, π0t takes on
either a high or a low value, both of which
are parameters that must be estimated:
π0(S1=0) and π0(S1=1). Similarly, another
unobserved binary state variable, S2, 
governs the size of the variance: s2
t =
s2(S2 = 0) or  s2(S2 = 1).  Subject to these
Markov-switching state variables and an
error term, equation 4 becomes 
(5)  ∆ Rt = [πt-1-π0t(S1)]+∆ [R+π]t\t-1+et,
where: et~student-t(mean = 0, n, s2t(S2)) 
Variance (e) = s2t(S2)n/(n-2)
S1
 
[{0,1}   S2[{0,1}
To allow for the possibility that interest-
rate changes have fatter-tailed distributions
than the normal distribution, we allow e to
have a student-t distribution with n
degrees of freedom.  
For reasons of tractability and clarity,
the two Markov processes are assumed to
undergo transitions between their states
independently of one another.  The
independence assumption precludes prior
restrictions that, for example, would
presuppose that inﬂation targeting is less
disciplined on average in the high-inﬂation
target state than in the low-inﬂation target
state.  In this case, the transition probabili-







Note that without the independence
assumption for S1 and S2, we would have
to estimate 12 transition probabilities
instead of 4.  
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR
U.S. DATA 1 971–1 995
Table 1 presents the estimates of equa-
tion 5 using quarterly data from 1971:2 to
1995:3.  The previous section and Dueker
(1993) discuss how the forecasts were
derived.  The estimates for the band width
of the implicit inﬂation target are π0(S1 =
0) = 6.33 and π0(S1 = 1) = 3.22, with anFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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unconditional probability of S1 = 1 equal
to 0.54 and an unconditional value of the
inﬂation target equal to 4.65 (arrived at
through 0.46 3 6.33 + 0.54 3 3.22).
Table 1 also reveals that the variance shifts
dramatically when S2 changes. 
Figure 1 shows the model-implied
inﬂation target, where the inferred target 
is equal to the probability-weighted sum 
of the high and low targets.  The estimated
inﬂation target (blue line) is plotted with 
a one-year moving average of actual
inﬂation (black line).  Actual inﬂation gen-
erally remains within the band deﬁned by
the two inﬂation target parameters except
for two periods surrounding the twin oil
shocks of the 1970s.  The estimated model
suggests that, since the disinﬂation of the
early 1980s, the implicit inﬂation target
has generally remained below 4 percent,
with a notable exception being 1989–1991.
Another interesting ﬁnding is that Table 1’s
sample-wide estimate of the low-inﬂation
state π0(S1=1)=3.22 is consistently higher
than the actual inﬂation rate after 1992.
Before addressing this issue, we need to
consider the model’s ﬁt.3
To see how well the inﬂation-targeting
model explains funds rate changes during
the past 25 years,  Figure 2 plots actual
versus model-implied changes in the federal
funds rate.  The indicator model tracks the
federal funds rate changes closely except
for 1974–1975 and 1980–1981.  The esti-
mates of Table 1’s variance parameters,
s2(S2=0) and s2(S2=1), show that the
standard deviation of the model’s error
increases by more than a factor of ﬁve in
the high-volatility state where S2=1.  In
general, funds rate changes appear more
consistent with a policy of inﬂation
targeting in the second half of the sample
than in the ﬁrst.  Even at its worst, the 
3 A richer version of the model
with feedback from the price level
gave almost identical results as
those in Table 1, because the
price-level feedback coefﬁcients
were essentially zero.  Policy did
not appear to respond to past
inﬂation surprises by attempting
to restore a price-level target.  
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prescriptions of the inﬂation-targeting pro-
cedure would not have produced much
greater interest-rate volatility than that
actually observed.  However, aggressive
interest-rate increases would have begun
much earlier in the late 1970s even if inﬂa-
tion had been targeted at 6.33 percent.
We should also look at the magnitude
of the deviations from the implicit inﬂation-
targeting speciﬁcation in relation to the
degree of uncertainty regarding the link
between funds rate changes and subsequent
inﬂation.  Figure 3 takes the time-varying
variance s2
t as a measure of the magnitude
of the deviations of funds rate changes from
the inﬂation-targeting speciﬁcation and
compares it with the time-varying forecast
error variance of ∆ [R+π], Ft\t-1.  The strong
positive correlation between the two vari-
ances leads to questions of causality.  One
possible explanation is that the uncertainty
about the relationship between interest rates
and inﬂation is extrinsic.  The Fed therefore
chooses to follow an inﬂation-targeting
policy more closely when the link between
policy actions and inﬂation outcomes is
relatively clear.  An alternative view is that
a policy of inﬂation targeting helps pin
down the relationship between inﬂation
and the funds rate, thereby lowering the
forecast error variance.  An attempt to sort
out the direction of causality is beyond the
scope of this article.  Figure 3 is intended
merely to highlight an interesting correla-
tion between the two variances.
With regard to how close the policy-
implied baseline rate inﬂation is to and has
been to price stability, our results suggest
that signiﬁcant progress has been made since
the 1970s and 1980s.  The baseline rate of
inﬂation has been ﬁrmly anchored in the
low-inﬂation state since 1992.  The baseline
inﬂation rate from the mid-1980s to the early
1990s, in contrast, was less ﬁrmly placed
in the low-inﬂation state.  From Figure 1, 
it appears that the estimated parameter
π0(S1=1)=3.22 is perhaps too high to
describe the inﬂation target in the mid-
1990s.  To investigate this conjecture,
we imposed alternative values of π0 to the
post-1991 period to see which best describes
the actual changes in the funds rate.  Figure 4
compares results for values of π0 ranging
from 1 percent to 4 percent.  The actual
changes in the funds rate have generally
been between the changes suggested by
the 2 percent and 3 percent inﬂation targets.
The ease in September 1992,  however, was
more consistent with the 4 percent target.  
Although some observers believed that
the Fed had maintained a funds rate target
of 3 percent for too long during 1993,
Figure 4 shows that the actual changes 
in the funds rate remained between bounds
implied by 2 percent and 3 percent inﬂation
targets throughout 1993.  The initial
increases in the funds rate in early 1994
were consistent with the adoption of a
Figure 3
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target between 1 percent and 2 percent.
The actual funds rate changes, however,
soon returned to the range consistent with
an inﬂation target between 2 percent and 
3 percent.  Finally, the 25 basis point cut in
the target funds rate in July 1995 was con-
sistent with the overall thrust of the funds
rate changes during the previous three
years—more consistent with an implicit
inﬂation target between 2 percent and 
3 percent than with the sample-wide 
parameter estimate π0(S1=1)=3.22.  
The experiment cannot be regarded as a
complete counterfactual account of what
would have happened if the implicit inﬂa-
tion target had really been, say 2 percent,
throughout the post-1991 period, because
such counterfactual accounts require sim-
ulations of a fully speciﬁed model of the
economy that characterizes all relevant
interaction between inﬂation and monetary
policy.  Our experiment shows what would
have happened,  for example,  if the Fed had
each period adopted a 2 percent inﬂation
target, taking the past as given.  Nevertheless
our experiment does help indicate whether
a given change in the funds rate was more
consistent with a 2 percent inﬂation target
vs. a 4 percent inﬂation target.
MEASURING PROGRESS
TOWARD PRICE STABILITY
We have presented an inﬂation
targeting model of U.S. monetary policy 
to examine how closely inﬂation targeting
describes past policy and, if so, how the
implicit inﬂation targets appeared to vary
across time.  The inﬂation target inferred
from the model increases to more than 
6 percent by the mid-1970s and begins to
decline in 1983.  By 1984, the Fed had
engineered a decrease in the trend rate 
of inﬂation to less than 3.5 percent.  The
model detects some backsliding that had
occurred by the late 1980s, when the trend
rate brieﬂy rose again.  The early 1990s,
however, witnessed a disinﬂation that
brought the baseline rate of inﬂation to
about 3 percent.  Our model ﬁnds that 
the series of seven increases in the funds
rate within a year (from early 1994 to early
1995) corresponds with a policy of holding
the implicit inﬂation target relatively steady
at a rate between 2 percent and 3 percent.
Nevertheless, a gap remains between this
level of inﬂation and what might be called
“price stability.”  
Our results also uncover a strong 
positive correlation between the forecast
error variance in the uncertain relationship
between funds rate changes and subsequent
inﬂation and the extent to which inﬂation
targeting describes the actual funds rate
changes.  One explanation for this correla-
tion is that the Fed has targeted inﬂation
more stringently during periods when 
policymakers could be relatively conﬁdent
in using the funds rate as an instrument 
to target inﬂation.  Alternatively, an inﬂa-
tion-targeting regime might engender 
a tighter relationship between the funds
rate and inﬂation.  
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